Submitted by huangmingyou on 周一, 2006-03-27 09:59
我正在测试用zorp做https的反向代理,但是如果在zorp前加上lvs这一层就不能工作。这需要一些特别的处理吗?
我在手册上看到说:
Ratz has written a tproxy patch for LVS as part of his job, but he is not allowed to release the code - it seems I confused the two patches.)
现在这个问题有什么解决方法吗?
Comments
wensong
周五, 2006-03-31 10:50
Permalink
你能否讲一下zorp做https反向代理的工作原理和流程?然后我们看在LVS上需要做什么工作让它运行起来。
huangmingyou
周五, 2006-04-07 02:13
Permalink
一两句话也说不清楚,我把他的README文件贴出来
These are my patches against linux kernel 2.4 to implement transparent proxy
functions.
The author of the transparent proxy patches is me, Bal�zs Scheidler, you can
reach me at bazsi at balabit dot hu. The latest version can always be found
at http://www.balabit.hu/en/downloads/tproxy/
I hope it will be integrated into mainstream kernel as soon as possible
(probably during the 2.5.x development series).
What does the term 'proxy' mean?
--------------------------------
A proxy is a server-like program, receiving requests from clients,
forwarding those requests to the real server on behalf of users,
and returning the response as it arrives.
Proxies read and parse the application protocol, and reject invalid
traffic. As most attacks violate the application protocol, disallowing
protocol violations usually protects against attacks.
What is transparent proxying?
-----------------------------
To simplify management tasks of clients sitting behind proxy
firewalls, the technique 'transparent proxying' was invented.
Transparent proxying means that the presence of the proxy is invisible
to the user. Transparent proxying however requires kernel support.
We have a 'REDIRECT' target, isn't that enough?
----------------------------------------------
Real transparent proxying requires the following three features from
the IP stack of the computer it is running on:
1. Redirect sessions destined to the outer network to a local process
using a packet filter rule.
2. Make it possible for a process to listen to connections on a
foreign address.
3. Make it possible for a process to initiate a connection with a
foreign address as a source.
Item #1 is usually provided by packet filtering packages like
Netfilter/IPTables, IPFilter. (yes, this is the REDIRECT target)
All three were provided in Linux kernels 2.2.x, but support for this
was removed.
How to install it?
------------------
Patch your kernel using:
cd /usr/src/linux
for i in /patch_tree/*.diff; do cat $i | patch -p1; done
then enable conntrack, nat and tproxy support, compile your kernel and
modules.
Prior to starting a program using transparent proxy functions the module
iptable_tproxy.o must be loaded. It is _not_ autoloaded by default.
You'll also have to patch your iptables userspace by using the following
command:
cd /usr/src/iptables-1.2.X
cat /iptables/*.diff | patch -p1
make KERNELDIR=/usr/src/linux
Of course you might need to change the path in the examples above.
How to start using it?
----------------------
This implementation of transparent proxying works by creating implicit
NAT rules. This means that redirection, foreign address listen, and
foreign address connect (the three features required for transparent
proxying) all create a NAT mapping of some sort.
NOTE: that this doesn't mean that the 'nat' table will be modified in any
way.
Now let's see what happens when a proxy tries to use the required tproxy
features I outlined earlier.
1. Redirection
This is easy, as this was already supported by iptables. Redirection is
equivalent with the following nat rule:
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -j DNAT --to-dest --to-port
is one the IP address of the interface where the packet
entered the IP stack
is the port where the proxy was bound to
To indicate that this is not simple NAT rule, a separate table named
'tproxy' was created:
iptables -t tproxy -A PREROUTING -j TPROXY --on-port
The local IP address is determined automatically, but can be overridden
by the --on-ip parameter.
2. Listening for connections on a foreign address
There are protocols which use more than a single TCP channel for
communication. The best example is FTP which uses a command channel for
sending commands, and a data channel to transfer the body of files. The
secondary channel can be established in both active and passive mode,
active meaning the server connects back to the client, passive meaning
the client connects to the server on another port.
Let's see the passive case, when the client establishes a connection to
the address returned in the response of the PASV FTP command.
As the presence of the proxy is transparent to the client, the target
IP address of the secondary channel (e.g. the address in the PASV
response) is the server (and not the firewall) and this connection must
also be handled by the proxy.
The first solution that comes to mind is to add a a TPROXY rule
automatically (e.g. to redirect a connection destined to a given server
on a given port to a local process), however it is not feasible, adding
rules on the fly should not be required as it would mess the
administrator's own rules, the NAT translation should be done
implicitly without touching the user rulebase.
To do this on a Linux 2.2 kernel it was enough to call bind() on a
socket with a foreign IP address, and if a new connection to the given
foreign IP was routed through the firewall the connection was
intercepted. This solution however distracted the core network kernel
hackers and removed this feature. This implementation tries to make the
transparent proxy features independent from the core network stack,
therefore it works a bit differently:
* the proxy binds to a local address first
* the proxy then issues an IP_TPROXY_ASSIGN setsockopt.
IP_TPROXY_ASSIGN registers the local address the proxy bound to,
with the foreign address it is interested in. This relationship is
stored in a hash table within the iptable_tproxy module.
* as a final step the proxy instructs the kernel that it wants to
LISTEN for connections, this is done by calling an IP_TPROXY_FLAGS
setsockopt with a flags value of ITP_LISTEN.
When this setup is complete, the kernel (more exactly a netfilter hook
registered at PREROUTING) generates a NAT mapping if there is a
registered socket for incoming NEW connections.
3. Initiating connections with a foreign address as a source
Similarly to the case outlined above, it is sometimes necessary to be
able to initiate a connection with a foreign IP address as a source.
Imagine the active FTP case when the FTP client listens for connections
with source address equal to the server. Another example: a webserver
in your DMZ which does access control based on client IP address. If
the proxy could not initiate connections with foreign IP address, the
webserver would see the inner IP address of the firewall itself.
In Linux 2.2 this was accomplished by bind()-ing to a foreign address
prior calling connect(), and it worked. In this tproxy patch it is done
somewhat similar to the case 2 outlined above.
* the proxy binds to a local address first
* the proxy then issues an IP_TPROXY_ASSIGN setsockopt.
IP_TPROXY_ASSIGN registers the local address the proxy bound to,
with the foreign address it wants its source address to be changed
to. This relationship is stored in a hash table within the
iptable_tproxy module.
* as a final step the proxy instructs the kernel that it wants to
initiate a connection, this is done by calling an IP_TPROXY_FLAGS
setsockopt with a flags value of ITP_CONNECT.
How to use it?
--------------
So you now know how this tproxy thing works, and what its aims have been.
This section serves as an introduction on how this works out in practice.
The only proxy firewall which supports the features above is Zorp. Zorp
is an application level proxy firewall suite designed with three main
goals:
* the best application layer protocol analysis (unknown protocol
elements are rejected instead of let through, proxies work according
to RFCs)
* flexibility, decisions are scriptable, requests can be rewritten etc.
(imagine a firewall which changes server based on HTTP request,
normal HTTP requests go to an Apache, WebDAV requests to another apache,
possibly running under a different uid)
* modularity, proxies are not individual entities, they can be attached
together, embedded part of protocols can be further analyzed.
(transport protocols such as SSL/TLS can be decrypted on the fly, and
the decypted stream fed into another proxy, so URL filtering within
HTTPS is possible)
That's it about the marketing stuff, Zorp is available at
http://www.balabit.hu/en/downloads/zorp-gpl/
So how to build a ruleset for a real-life proxy firewall?
Storing the ruleset
-------------------
Some people like storing their ruleset as a shell script which invokes
the necessary iptables commands. As I don't like mixing executable code
and data we use the format defined by iptables-save & iptables-restore.
As raw iptables-restore format has no macro possibility we created a
frontend named iptables-utils where a couple of scripts help the creation
and maintenance of a packet filter rulesets. Here's an outline of the
iptables-utils approach:
* the following files are used by iptables-utils:
- iptables.conf.in: contains our ruleset before processing, this is a
user supplied file, we are going to edit this with our favourite
editor
- iptables.conf.var: contains our macro definitions, it might contain
a series of C like #define statements. I say C like because macro
substition differs from cpp.
- iptables.conf.new: when processing conf.in & conf.var our new
ruleset will be generated here
- iptables.conf: is our current ruleset, iptables.conf.new is copied
here if found to be correct
* the ruleset is maintained the following way:
- you edit either iptables.conf.in or iptables.conf.var
- you process your modifications by the command 'iptables-gen', this
will result in a iptables.conf.new to be generated
- you test your new ruleset by invoking 'iptables-test', this script
loads the new ruleset, waits a couple of seconds and reloads the
old ruleset, if you made a mistake you are still not closed out
from the system
- if the new ruleset is ok, you invoke 'iptables-commit' which
overwrites iptables.conf with iptables.conf.new and loads the
ruleset
Using iptables-utils is absolutely beneficial in the long term as the
number of system-closeouts dramatically decreased, which is good if you
are hundreds of miles of away from the firewall.
Macro expansion is not simple substition, if a macro contains several
words the rule where the macro is referenced is copied, at the end you
get a new rule for each word in your macro. For instance:
iptables.conf.var:
#define SSH_PERMITTED 1.2.3.4 1.2.3.5
iptables.conf.in:
-A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp -s SSH_PERMITTED --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
You will get two rules the first with 1.2.3.4 substituted, the second
with 1.2.3.5 substituted.
Identifying firewall neighbourhood
----------------------------------
The aim for the firewall is to be a border between different security
zones. A simple firewall has two zones: 'internal network' and 'external
network'. A more complex firewall might have more zones, I built
firewalls with more than 10 ethernet interfaces myself. The first task is
to name those zones, the name should be short but still identifiable.
Let's name the zones this way:
internal network: 'intra'
external network: 'inter'
demilitarized zone: 'dmz'
In our example a single firewall will be used, the DMZ will be one of the
zones of our firewall.
Naming the chains
-----------------
In addition to the standard chains provided by iptables (INPUT, OUTPUT
etc) we will create separate chains for each security zone. Each security
zone will have two chains:
* a chain which contains rules for traffic which passes the firewall
* a chain which contains rules for traffic destined to the firewall
The first one will be prefixed by PR which stands for PRoxy rules, the
second one will be prefixed by LO which stands for LOcal rules. Proxy
rules will be placed into the 'tproxy' table, local rules will be placed
into the 'filter' table. If we assume that all traffic goes through
proxies we won't need NAT nor mangle rules. (of course we can add further
finetuning to our rulebase, like limiting the number of SYNs etc)
Jumping to our chains
---------------------
We have two set of chains for each security zone, LOxxx chains are
processed in the filter table, INPUT chain. PRxxx chains are processed in
the tproxy table, PREROUTING/OUTPUT chain.
Our filter/INPUT chain will be something like this:
...
-A INPUT -m tproxy -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -i -j LOintra
-A INPUT -i -j LOinter
-A INPUT -i -j LOdmz
-A INPUT -j DROP
This means that all permitted traffic must be enabled in their specific
chain or will be dropped on the INPUT chain. Of course logging dropped
packets would be a good idea. It is important to mention that our
FORWARD chain should contain a single DROP rule as we don't forward
packets. Each LOxxx chain should look like this:
-A LOintra -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
... permit each service ...
-A LOintra -j DROP
Of course our LOxxx chains might be different for each zone, as we might
permit SSH access from the intranet only.
Note the '-m tproxy' rule at the front of other rules, it allows all
traffic redirected by any TPROXY feature to pass the filter table. (this
includes TPROXY redirections, and foreign-bound traffic)
We took care about local services provided by the firewall, let's
make our proxying rules now.
Our tproxy/PREROUTING chain will be something like this:
-A PREROUTING -i -d ! -j PRintra
-A PREROUTING -i -d ! -j PRinter
-A PREROUTING -i -d ! -j PRdmz
A PRxxx chain should something like this:
-A PRintra -d 0/0 --dport 80 -j TPROXY --on-port 50080
... repeat the above rule for each service ...
At the end of a PRxxx chain no DROP should be performed, as unmodified
sessions will be stopped when the filter table is evaluated. The port
number specified by TPROXY rules should match the port number where the
transparent proxy (Zorp in our example) will be bound.
Zorp configuration
------------------
The configuration in iptables rules and Zorp must match, a short Zorp
policy which is bound to 50080 (matching the example rule above) is below:
from Zorp.Core import *
from Zorp.Http import *
InetZone('intranet', '192.168.1.0/24',
inbound_services=[],
outbound_services=["*"])
InetZone('dmz', '10.0.0.0/24',
inbound_services=[],
outbound_services=[])
InetZone('internet', '0.0.0.0/0',
inbound_services['*'],
outbound_services=[])
def intra():
Service('intra_HTTP', HttpProxy)
Listener(SockAddrInet('', 50080), 'intra_HTTP')
The example might be indented, as Python is sensitive to indenting,
please unindent it so that lines start on the first column.
How it works?
-------------
Within the tproxy module in the kernel there's a table describing the
relationship between local sockets and a non-local IP address/port pair. A
local socket is referenced by its local IP/port, therefore all sockets to be
used for transparent proxy purposes must be bound to a local IP prior
anything can be done.
To connect from, or listen on a foreign address an entry to this table must
be added.
To add a translation table entry, create a socket (bind it to a local
interface), and call the setsockopt IP_TPROXY_ASSIGN at level SOL_IP with a
structure describing the nonlocal address (struct in_tproxy).
If this setsockopt succeeds, specify what you want to do with the given
socket, by calling IP_TPROXY_FLAGS with the combination of the bits in
in_tproxy.h:
/* bitfields in IP_TPROXY_FLAGS */
#define ITP_CONNECT 0x00000001
#define ITP_LISTEN 0x00000002
#define ITP_ONCE 0x00010000
ITP_CONNECT means you want to initiate a connection, ITP_LISTEN means you
want to accept connections on the foreign address specified in
IP_TPROXY_ASSIGN.
ITP_ONCE means that this translation is to be performed only once, and then
it should be removed from the table atomically. You usually want to specify
ITP_ONCE with ITP_CONNECT, and may specify ITP_ONCE for listening socket
when only one connection is to be accepted. (FTP data connection for
example)
rager
周二, 2006-09-19 03:11
Permalink
请问huangmingyou :你的是否已经实现???用的什么版本
我现在在用Zorp3.0.5,只差一点了就OK了,可是被一个error拦住,一直没解决,请教:
运行zorpctl start
Starting Zorp Firewall Suite: Fatal Python error:PyEval_AcquireThread: NULL new thread state
intra!Fatal Python error:PyEval_AcquireThread: NULL new thread state
dmz!Fatal Python error:PyEval_AcquireThread: NULL new thread state
inter!Fatal Python error:PyEval_AcquireThread: NULL new thread state
不知huangmingyou是否遇到同样问题?~!提前谢过~!